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ABSTRACT
Quantification of the uncertainties in future climate projections is crucial for the implementation of
climate policies. Here a review of projections of global temperature change over the twenty-first century is
provided for the six illustrative emission scenarios from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
that assume no policy intervention, based on the latest generation of coupled general circulation models,
climate models of intermediate complexity, and simple models, and uncertainty ranges and probabilistic
projections from various published methods and models are assessed. Despite substantial improvements in
climate models, projections for given scenarios on average have not changed much in recent years. Recent
progress has, however, increased the confidence in uncertainty estimates and now allows a better separation
of the uncertainties introduced by scenarios, physical feedbacks, carbon cycle, and structural uncertainty.
Projection uncertainties are now constrained by observations and therefore consistent with past observed
trends and patterns. Future trends in global temperature resulting from anthropogenic forcing over the next
few decades are found to be comparably well constrained. Uncertainties for projections on the century time
scale, when accounting for structural and feedback uncertainties, are larger than captured in single models
or methods. This is due to differences in the models, the sources of uncertainty taken into account, the type
of observational constraints used, and the statistical assumptions made. It is shown that as an approxima-
tion, the relative uncertainty range for projected warming in 2100 is the same for all scenarios. Inclusion of
uncertainties in carbon cycle–climate feedbacks extends the upper bound of the uncertainty range by more
than the lower bound.
1. Introduction
Climate models forced with changing anthropogenic
greenhouse gas, sulfur dioxide, and other aerosol emis-
sions project global-mean surface air temperature to
increase substantially in the future. The range of uncer-
tainty given in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Third Assessment Report (TAR) for
the end of the twenty-first century (2100 relative to
1990) was 1.4°–5.8°C (Cubasch et al. 2001) for the Spe-
cial Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) noninter-
vention emissions scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart
2000). However, the interpretation of that temperature
range is difficult for at least two reasons. First, it is a
range produced by several models, with no indication
of a likelihood distribution, and no confidence attached
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JCLI2119to the range (e.g., the probability for a temperature rise
above that range is unknown). Second, the range com-
bines uncertainties in both emission scenarios and cli-
mate model responses and gives no clear indication of
the relative importance of these two quite distinct types
of uncertainty. Uncertainties in the response of the cli-
mate system to a given emissions scenario, dominated
by uncertainties in the climate sensitivity and the rate of
ocean heat uptake, are determined by our incomplete
understanding of physical processes and the limitations
of climate models. The strength of the relevant climate
feedbacks cannot significantly be influenced by human
activities. The uncertainties in emissions, on the other
hand, are an uncertainty related to human actions and
decisions, and in that sense are a choice rather than an
intrinsic uncertainty. It is therefore important to con-
sider the uncertainty in the climate response separately
for each emissions scenario (Knutti et al. 2002; Wigley
2004).
While in a subjectivist Bayesian framework, likeli-
hoods or conditional probabilistic distributions of
warming for a given scenario may be estimated by stan-
dard methods, deriving likelihoods of warming across
scenarios is more problematic, because no likelihoods
have been attached to any of the individual SRES sce-
narios. In the absence of such information, equal prob-
ability has sometimes been assumed for each scenario
(see e.g., Wigley and Raper 2001). Another limitation
of analyses based on the SRES scenarios is that they
assume no efforts to mitigate climate change, and thus
at least on the lower bound do not span the full eco-
nomically and technically feasible range of future emis-
sion pathways that mitigation would allow.
Progress has been made since the publication of the
IPCC TAR (Houghton et al. 2001) in quantifying and
understanding uncertainties in future temperature pro-
jections. Probabilistic projections with a variety of mod-
els of different complexity and different statistical
methods have emerged, using large ensembles of sim-
plified models, statistical emulators, and combining ob-
servations with models using Bayesian methods. Cli-
mate responses have been simulated with a larger num-
ber and more comprehensive atmosphere–ocean
general circulation models (AOGCMs) than ever be-
fore, and uncertainties in carbon cycle–climate feed-
backs (i.e., the fact that ocean and terrestrial carbon
uptake depends on the climatic state) have been esti-
mated using models of different complexities.
Here we present global temperature projections from
the most recent coordinated model intercomparison
performed for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
(AR4; Meehl et al. 2007), and identify the robust con-
clusions as well as the differences arising from the use
of different probabilistic methods. We provide a more
comprehensive discussion than in AR4 in order to
achieve a more in-depth view on the various methods;
where and why they agree or differ; expand on how the
newer AOGCM projections compare to earlier ones;
show why the AR4 results differ from the TAR; and
quantify the contributions of scenario, climate feed-
back, carbon cycle feedback, and structural uncertainty
to the total uncertainty. We show that relative uncer-
tainties are the same for different SRES emissions sce-
narios, independent of the total amount of greenhouse
gas emissions.
2. Results
a. Probability density functions and ranges from
individual methods
In the large coordinated modeling effort of the
World Climate Research Coupled Model Intercompari-
son Project phase 3 (WCRP CMIP3), in preparation for
the IPCC AR4, 23 AOGCMs have simulated climate
change over the twentieth century and made projec-
tions into the future for low, medium, and high nonin-
tervention emissions scenarios (SRES B1, A1B, and
A2, respectively) that are based on different assump-
tions about population growth, economic development,
energy use, and globalization. Although problematic
for reasons detailed below, the multimodel mean and
standard deviation of global temperature change are
shown in Fig. 1. The ranges in that figure are best seen
as an illustration of uncertainty ranges, despite the fact
that the figure uses the most comprehensive models
available. The main difficulties in interpreting an en-
semble of opportunity are the following. First, the set of
models represents an ensemble of opportunity, neither
sampled randomly nor systematically, and is not de-
signed to span an uncertainty range. Different models
have different climate sensitivities and the range and
distribution of these sensitivities differ from ranges and
distributions estimated from observational data. Sec-
ond, the models are not all independent (Tebaldi and
Knutti 2007). Third, not all models have simulated all
scenarios. This results in the spread for the higher sce-
nario A2 apparently being smaller than for the lower
scenario B1. However, for the subset of models that
have run both scenarios, the spread is larger for A2
than for B1, consistent with the constant relative un-
certainty argument further discussed below. Fourth,
different models use different sets of forcings, and they
quantify the common forcings differently (Collins et al.
2006; Forster and Taylor 2006). Fifth, it seems impor-
tant to note that for prescribed emissions, carbon cycle
processes, themselves dependent on the climate change
2652 JOURNAL OF CLIMATE V OLUME 21response, substantially affect the modeled atmospheric
CO2 concentration (Friedlingstein et al. 2006) and thus
radiative forcing, yet all AOGCMs considered here
prescribe atmospheric CO2 from offline carbon cycle
simulations, and many of them use the same atmo-
spheric concentration scenario. While they all account
for carbon cycle–climate feedback uncertainties, their
projected temperature range is smaller than it would be
if they all had accounted for the uncertainty in the car-
bon cycle–climate feedbacks.
Physical feedbacks determine the temperature re-
sponse to a given atmospheric concentration. This tem-
perature response can be characterized by the equilib-
rium climate sensitivity (the global equilibrium surface
temperature response to a doubling of atmospheric
CO2) and the transient climate response (TCR; the
global surface temperature response at the time of CO2
doubling in a scenario where atmospheric CO2 in-
creases by 1% yr
1, i.e., in a 20-yr mean period cen-
tered at year 70). By definition, equilibrium climate
sensitivity and TCR do not include carbon cycle feed-
backs, because both concepts connect temperature
changes to a given CO2 concentration. The effect of the
changing climate on the carbon cycle is treated as a
feedback and is considered in all climate change pro-
jections presented here. While a temperature response
to a given emission can be defined (i.e., combining the
physical and biogeochemical feedbacks) as a reference
number (like climate sensitivity describing only the
physical feedbacks), it is of limited use, since the tem-
perature response to a given emission depends both on
the time and the climate state.
The difficulty in interpreting the TAR results in
terms of probability has prompted several attempts to
provide probability density functions (PDFs) of global
temperature increase. Note that each of these distribu-
tions is of course conditional on the model, method,
and data constraint that are used, and that the percen-
tiles of the distributions reflect a degree of belief that
warming would fall within certain temperature ranges if
we were to follow these scenarios, rather than a fre-
quency of occurrence in an experiment that is repeated
many times. Figure 2 (left column, lower part of each
panel) summarizes the available cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDFs), for the six illustrative SRES sce-
narios, for the early (2020–29, dashed CDFs) and late-
twenty-first century (2090–99, solid CDFs), relative to
the 1980–99 average. In short, Wigley and Raper (2001)
produce PDFs from a large ensemble with a simple
upwelling diffusion energy balance model, varying cli-
mate sensitivity, ocean vertical diffusivity, carbon cycle
feedbacks, and aerosol forcing. Parameters are varied
in ranges considered plausible by the authors (most
ranges were taken from the IPCC TAR); no formal
observational constraints are applied. The uncertainty
in climate sensitivity (being the largest contribution to
the total uncertainty for a given scenario) is repre-
sented as a lognormal distribution where the 1.5°–4.5°C
range corresponds to the 90% confidence interval.
Knutti et al. (2003) consider uncertainties in climate
sensitivity, ocean diffusivity, and different mixing pa-
rameterizations (e.g., horizontal–vertical diffusion, iso-
pycnal diffusion, and Gent–McWilliams mixing; Knutti
et al. 2000), carbon cycle feedbacks, and all radiative
forcing components individually in an intermediate
complexity climate model (EMIC) with a dynamical
ocean and an energy balance atmosphere, and con-
FIG. 1. (a) Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration for the
SRES scenarios B1 (blue), A1B (green), and A2 (red) derived
with the BernCC model (Joos et al. 2001) for the TAR [Houghton
et al. 2001; and used to force most of the simulations in (b)]. Note
that the scenarios prescribe emissions, and atmospheric concen-
trations and radiative forcings considered in the AOGCMs vary.
(b) Global-mean surface air temperature anomalies from the
1980–99 average for SRES scenarios B1 (blue), A1B (green), A2
(red), and for the historic twentieth-century simulation (black).
Lines denote the ensemble mean and shaded bands denote one
standard deviation of the multimodel response. Ensemble mem-
bers were averaged first for each model, such that each model is
given equal weight, although note that not all simulations are
available for all models. The observed temperature for the twen-
tieth century is given in orange for comparison (Jones and
Moberg 2003).
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Fig 1 live 4/CFIG. 2. Global-mean temperature projections for the six illustrative SRES scenarios. (left) The CDFs for global-mean surface air
temperature increase for short-term (2020–29, dashed) and long-term (2090–99, solid) projections relative to the 1980–99 average are
shown at bottom of each plot. Different colors mark different models or statistical methods. Lines are only shown from the 5% to the
95% level, thus the horizontal dimension of each curve marks the 5%–95% confidence range. Light gray shading marks the envelope
of all CDFs. Labels with asterisks indicate that the respective method considers carbon cycle–climate feedback uncertainties. Other
estimates of uncertainty for 2090–99 are shown at the top of each plot. Central values and ranges are given as means and 5%–95% from
a fitted normal distribution to the AR4 AOGCM simulations (red circles and lines) for B1, A1B, and A2, along with results for each
individual AR4 AOGCM (red dots). For B2, A1T, and A1FI, AOGCM means are estimated using scaling factors from the MAGICC
model (red triangles, see text). From the MAGICC simple model (dark green symbols) tuned to 19 AR4 AOGCMs, means (circles)
and one standard deviations (squares) are given for fixed carbon cycle parameters (indicating the uncertainty caused by the climate
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Fig 2 live 4/Cstrain the multithousand-member ensemble with the
observed global surface warming (Jones and Moberg
2003) and ocean heat uptake (Levitus et al. 2000). A
uniform prior distribution from 1° to 10°C is assumed
for climate sensitivity. Because climate sensitivity is
poorly constrained from the observed global-mean
warming trends (Forest et al. 2002; Knutti et al. 2002;
Frame et al. 2005) and the use of a uniform prior dis-
tribution on climate sensitivity, that study finds larger
probabilities for high warming than most others. The
simplified models used in these studies have the advan-
tage that a large portion of the parameter space can be
explored, parameters like climate sensitivity can be ad-
justed to match specific distributions, and very large
ensembles of simulations can be generated. On the
other hand, those types of models inevitably have to
simplify the description of feedback processes.
Stott and Kettleborough (2002) and Stott et al.
(2006) use a detection-attribution method to derive
best-guess scaling factors and uncertainty ranges, by
which model-simulated greenhouse gas and aerosol re-
sponses each have to be multiplied to best match twen-
tieth-century climate change. These scaling factors are
then used to estimate the best estimate and uncertainty
range of future change and account for uncertainties in
the estimate of greenhouse gas forcing to twentieth-
century change caused by internal variability and un-
certainty in natural forced variability as well as for un-
certainty in climate sensitivity and ocean heat uptake.
Carbon cycle uncertainties are not considered. This
method does not explicitly prescribe a prior distribution
for climate sensitivity, but in effect it implicitly uses a
uniform prior on TCR [or equivalent, the greenhouse
gas attributable warming, see also Frame et al. (2006)],
which a priori assigns a lower probability to high values
of climate sensitivity than what the uniform prior on
climate sensitivity (Knutti et al. 2002) does. Therefore,
for long-term projections where climate sensitivity be-
comes increasingly important, the Stott et al. (2006)
method tends to assign lower probability to very high
warming. The use of more detailed information and a
noise reducing metric on surface temperature changes
also leads to reduced uncertainty and a narrower PDF.
The detection method is based on one or more
AOGCMs, which is a more accurate representation of
the climate system than the simple models or EMICs,
but it has to assume a certain linearity in the way model
mismatch against observations over the past decades
projects into the future.
Furrer et al. (2007a,b) use a Bayesian spatial hierar-
chical method to obtain PDFs at each grid point from
the set of AR4 AOGCMs. The assumptions are that the
response from each AOGCM can be decomposed into
the “true” underlying large-scale climate change signal
plus a small-scale noise component representing model
error and internal variability. The noise component is
specific to each model, but is assumed to have zero
average across all models. The climate change signal is
decomposed into a series of spherical harmonics and
corresponding coefficients, along with their uncertain-
ties. By recombining the PDFs of the coefficients with
the basis functions, a joint PDF of the true climate
change signal at each location can be obtained. The
results from that method are based on the most com-
plete and recent set of models, which in contrast to all
other methods samples structural uncertainty in the
models to some degree. However, the results share the
limitations in the underlying multimodel ensemble
dataset noted above; namely, that the range of
AOGCMs may not adequately sample the range of un-
certainty that we think exists. The implicit underlying
distribution of climate sensitivity is the one of the
CMIP3 AOGCM ensemble.
Harris et al. (2006) combine a 17-member perturbed
physics ensemble of the fully coupled Hadley Centre
coupled climate model version 3 (HadCM3) AOGCM
←
only), and one standard deviation including carbon cycle uncertainties (asterisks). For the Bern2.5CC EMIC (light green symbols), the
central values use a medium climate sensitivity and standard carbon cycle settings (circles), uncertainties are estimated by combining
a high and low climate sensitivity with standard carbon cycle settings (squares) and by combinations of a low climate sensitivity and an
efficient carbon cycle (i.e., removing excess carbon quickly from the atmosphere), and a high climate sensitivity and an inefficient
carbon cycle (asterisks) to sample the full range. Individual model results are shown for the C4MIP models for A2, accounting for
non-CO2 forcings (blue crosses). Model means and minimum maximum ranges (yellow bars) given in the TAR (Houghton et al. 2001)
resulting from the tuning of the MAGICC model to seven TAR AOGCMs, as well as means and minimum to maximum ranges from
nine AOGCMs shown in the TAR (Houghton et al. 2001; orange triangles and lines), are given for comparison. Ranges have been
adjusted to match the periods 2090–99 and 1980–99, and may slightly differ from the original publications. Note that some ranges are
simply minimum to maximum ranges from a set of models, or sensitivity tests of a model, and thus cannot be interpreted as percentiles
of a distribution. (right) The color bands show ranges of constant relative uncertainty around the CMIP3 AOGCM mean for all
scenarios, along with the individual estimates from the (left). A likely range of 40% to 60% (blue box) around the CMIP3 AOGCM
mean (thick blue line) was given in IPCC AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007) for the purpose of giving policy-relevant advice, based on expert
judgment and all the individual uncertainty estimates reviewed here.
1J UNE 2008 KNUTTI ET AL. 2655with an energy balance model and a larger ensemble of
slab simulations of the Hadley Centre coupled atmo-
spheric model version 3 (HadAM3) to emulate the
probabilistic response of a large perturbed physics en-
semble. As the Furrer et al. (2007b) method, this Had-
ley Centre ensemble (Harris et al. 2006) does not con-
sider carbon cycle uncertainties.
Both the new AOGCM results and the probabilistic
studies confirm that the anthropogenically forced short-
term temperature response (i.e., ignoring the possibility
of several large volcanic eruptions in the near future,
dashed CDFs) is quite well constrained (in terms of
absolute uncertainty), with relatively consistent results
across different methods. Temperature changes are al-
most independent of the scenario for the first few de-
cades of the projections. This is because the scenarios
are similar in terms of emissions at the beginning, and
because part of the short-term warming is a delayed
response to radiative forcing caused by past emissions.
About half of the warming over the next few decades
would occur even if the levels of atmospheric constitu-
ents and thus radiative forcing were held constant at
year 2000 values (constant composition commitment;
Meehl et al. 2005; Wigley 2005; Meehl et al. 2007). This
commitment idea (i.e., that warming will continue even
if the forcing is held constant) has been recognized long
ago (Hansen et al. 1984; Siegenthaler and Oeschger
1984; Wigley and Schlesinger 1985; Schlesinger 1986).
Also, some climate feedbacks or nonlinear interactions
only become important on longer time scales.
The similarity of the short-term projections must not
be misinterpreted as an argument that the choice of the
scenario is unimportant for climate change. On the con-
trary, it highlights the long time scales of the climate
system, implying that scenario choices today have an
effect in the far future (e.g., Hansen et al. 1988; Wigley
et al. 1996; Knutti et al. 2002; Stott and Kettleborough
2002). The increasing importance of scenario depen-
dence over time arises because the temperature re-
sponse of the system is determined by the stock of at-
mospheric greenhouse gases, rather than the flows rep-
resented by annual emissions. A consequence of this is
that mitigation efforts must be started soon to become
effective in the long term and avoid large (and poten-
tially very high impact) climate change, since much
more drastic mitigation efforts would be needed later to
avoid large future changes. Because of the long time
scales involved in the carbon cycle and the deep ocean,
it will take centuries or millennia, even for substantial
emission reductions, for the climate system to return
from high levels of atmospheric concentrations (e.g.,
700 ppm in SRES A1B year 2100) to a state similar to
that of today (Plattner et al. 2008).
The distributions for global-mean temperature
change shown in Fig. 2 are close to Gaussian and do not
show the pronounced long tail seen in many PDFs of
climate sensitivity (e.g., Andronova and Schlesinger
2001; Forest et al. 2002; Knutti et al. 2002; Hegerl et al.
2006). This reflects the nonlinear relationship between
TCR and climate sensitivity where the dependence of
the transient response on changes in climate sensitivity
reduces as the sensitivity increases (Hansen et al. 1984;
Knutti et al. 2005; Allen et al. 2006). We note that the
results depend on the assumed prior distribution for
climate sensitivity, the choice of which is currently de-
bated (Frame et al. 2005; Annan and Hargreaves 2006).
Because of the nonlinear relationship between TCR
and climate sensitivity, however, the effect is smaller
than when attempting to constrain climate sensitivity
itself. A renormalization of all results to the same prior
distribution of climate sensitivity is not straightforward,
and would be purely of reference value alone since any
given prior distribution is contestable. Rational minds
may disagree substantially regarding the form of the
appropriate prior for climate sensitivity, so any choice
of renormalization prior would be arbitrary. The results
reviewed here are consistent with previous studies
showing that transient climate change over the next
century and the maximum warming under strong miti-
gation scenarios is better constrained by observations
than the equilibrium warming in response to green-
house gas (GHG) levels stabilized well above preindus-
trial levels (Knutti et al. 2005; Frame et al. 2006).
Despite the similarities in the shapes of the CDFs
produced in different ways, there are noticeable offsets
by up to 1°C for the high scenarios. The disagreement
between different methods is consistently larger at the
upper than the lower bound [i.e., the horizontal dis-
tance between different CDFs (indicated by the light
gray shading) is larger at the 95% level than at the 5%
level]. This highlights the importance of considering
structural uncertainties (i.e., differences in the observa-
tional constraints used, the sources of uncertainties
considered, choices in the statistical methodology, and
single model biases persistent across whole ensembles)
independent of the parameters used. Note that in all of
those studies, simplifying the problem by neglecting cer-
tain sources of uncertainty (e.g., ignoring certain forcings,
neglecting uncertainties in radiative forcing for given
atmospheric concentrations; neglecting uncertainties in
ocean mixing, climate feedbacks, or in carbon cycle pa-
rameters; not accounting for internal unforced variabil-
ity) will almost always artificially reduce uncertainty
ranges and lead to overly confident conclusions.
In addition to probabilistic results, Fig. 2 also shows
the mean projections and one standard deviation
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house-Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC; Wig-
ley and Raper 2001), with climate feedback and ocean
heat uptake tuned to the 1% yr
1 CO2 increase simu-
lations of 19 CMIP3 AOGCMs, for a standard fixed
carbon cycle and for carbon cycle feedbacks approxi-
mately covering the Coupled Carbon Cycle Climate
Model Intercomparison Project (C4MIP; Friedlingstein
et al. 2006) range. Similarly, projections with the Uni-
versity of Bern two-dimensional Carbon Cycle Climate
Model (BERN2.5CC) EMIC model coupled to a simpli-
fied carbon cycle model (Joos et al. 1999, 2001; Plattner
et al. 2001) are shown for climate sensitivities of 1.5°,
3.2°, and 4.5°C (approximately covering the likely cli-
mate sensitivity range given in the TAR), with standard
carbon cycle settings and with carbon cycle parameters
tuned for efficient and inefficient carbon removal from
the atmosphere to the ocean and terrestrial biosphere.
The CMIP3 AOGCM results are also shown for the
B1, A1B, and A2 scenarios. For B2, A1T, and A1FI, no
AOGCM simulations are available, so the mean
AOGCM response for the year 2100 is approximated
by multiplying the mean AOGCM A1B response with
the ratios of temperature change between scenarios B2/
A1B, A1T/A1B, and A1FI/A1B, respectively, derived
from the MAGICC model. Note that the CMIP3 mod-
els prescribe greenhouse gas concentrations rather than
emissions, and do not sample carbon cycle uncertain-
ties. Results from C4MIP (Friedlingstein et al. 2006)
are shown for the A2 scenario, accounting additionally
for non-CO2 forcings (blue crosses). The minimum to
maximum range of the TAR AOGCMs as well as the
minimum to maximum range of the TAR MAGICC
model results, derived from tuning to seven of the nine
TAR AOGCMs, are shown for comparison. The raw
TAR AOGCM range (Fig. 2, orange lines) is wider
than the MAGICC range because MAGICC was not
tuned to the highest and lowest AOGCM in the TAR.
Since the uncertainty grows with time and with in-
creasing warming, it is instructive to study the relative
uncertainty (i.e., the spread divided by the median ver-
sus time) for a few of the uncertainty estimates. Figure
3a shows that after about 2020, the relative uncertainty
in the CMIP3 models (blue, for the subset of models
that have run all three scenarios) is almost constant
over time, and independent of the scenario. For the
EMIC PDF (Knutti et al. 2003), relative uncertainty
increases slightly with time, caused by very high climate
sensitivities (red). If climate sensitivity is assumed to be
below 4.5°C in that study (magenta), the relative un-
certainty is almost constant over time. Note that this
does not imply that this approach is a priori valid to
derive uncertainties throughout the twenty-first century
as will be detailed below. In the detection case (green;
Stott et al. 2006), the uncertainty is larger in the early
decades. Those results include a number of sources of
uncertainty in future temperatures that are not in-
cluded in some other uncertainty predictions. The pre-
dictions include uncertainty due to only having a small
number of predictions from forecast ensembles of the
forced response (often only one). In addition to the
uncertainty in the underlying anthropogenically forced
temperature change, they include uncertainty due to
future natural forcing, estimated from model estimates
of past variability in naturally forced temperatures. Fi-
nally, they additionally include the uncertainty due to
internal variability on top of the forced response and
also include the extra uncertainty from taking the dif-
ference between two imperfectly known decadal-mean
temperatures. Further details are given in the methods
section of Stott and Kettleborough (2002). The contri-
butions from internal unforced and natural forced vari-
ability are constant over time, and thus their relative
effect is larger in the early decades when the anthro-
pogenic forced signal is still weaker. When considering
only the forced response, the relative uncertainty in the
early part of the century is about 0.4, similar to the
estimates from other methods.
Figure 3b shows that for methods that do not assume
Gaussian distributions, the ratio of the 5% and 50%
percentile and the ratio of the 95% and 50% percentile
are also remarkably constant and similar for the EMIC
(magenta, for B1 and A2) and MAGICC PDFs (black,
all six illustrative scenarios). The uncertainty relative to
the median and variations across different scenarios are
larger at the upper bound than at the lower.
While each method has its own characteristic shape
for the evolution of uncertainty over time, they all
agree that for a given method, the relative uncertainty
toward the end of the century should be very similar for
each scenario. This is because the ratio of temperature
change to forcing is approximately constant across sce-
narios for the types of scenarios and time scales con-
sidered here. Note that the relative uncertainty for the
higher emission scenario A2 is always slightly smaller
than for A1B or B1, because for A2 the temperature
signal is larger and because the relative uncertainty in
the forcing is smaller due to the larger relative contri-
bution of GHG forcing. When considering only the
forced response, the relative uncertainty is also reason-
ably constant over time after 2020.
Note that when estimating uncertainty in short-term
projections (e.g., for the decade 2020–29) an additional
difficulty arises that has not been considered so far in
the literature. Projections are taken here as differences
to the average over the 1980–99 period, so effectively
1J UNE 2008 KNUTTI ET AL. 2657this is like making a projection in year 1990 for 2025
(i.e., 35 yr into the future). However, as of 2007, half of
those 35 yr have already passed, and the warming ob-
served from the base period up to 2007 has not been
considered in the projections. If the uncertainty is
growing linearly as argued above, then the uncertainty
estimate starting in the base period 1980–99 is likely to
be too large, and it would be smaller if the observations
until today had been used. While this is a small issue for
projections for 2100 (Meehl et al. 2007), it should be
kept in mind that for short-term projections, taking dif-
ferences to some base period in the past is problematic.
The problem gets worse the further back the base pe-
riod is chosen. Near-term uncertainties will be overes-
timated, even in the case where the trends of model and
observations are very similar.
b. Overall uncertainty range from multiple methods
There is no formal statistical way to combine all the
estimates summarized in Fig. 2, since they are not all
independent, and do not all consider the same sources
of uncertainty. One option is to resort to imprecise
probability (e.g., Kriegler and Held 2005; Hall et al.
2007; Tomassini et al. 2007), that is, consider an uncer-
tainty in PDFs or sets of PDFs. However, these second-
order uncertainties are not easy to understand for the
nonexpert, and the dependencies of the different meth-
ods are an issue.
FIG. 3. (a) Relative uncertainty of global-mean surface air temperature increase above
1980–99 vs time for different models and methods. For PDFs, the relative uncertainty is
defined here as half of the 5%–95% range, divided by the median of the PDF. For the
AOGCMs, the relative uncertainty is taken as 1.65 times the standard deviation across the
models divided by the mean. For a normal distribution, the two definitions are identical. The
relative uncertainty is shown for scenarios B1 (solid), A1B (dotted), and A2 (dashed), for the
subset of the AR4 AOGCMs (blue) that have run all three scenarios, for probabilistic pro-
jections with an EMIC (Knutti et al. 2003) for climate sensitivity constrained by observations
(red) and climate sensitivity in the range of 1.5°–4.5°C constrained by observations (magenta),
and for the fingerprint scaling methods (Stott et al. 2006; green) using the HadCM3 (label H),
NOAA/GFDL R30 (label G), and NCAR PCM (label P) AOGCMs. The Stott et al. results
are shown as one value per decade; the other estimates are based on 10-yr running means to
reduce noise. (b) The 5% and 95% percentiles each divided by the median for the EMIC PDF
and scenarios B1 and A2 (magenta; Knutti et al. 2003) and for the MAGICC PDF for all six
illustrative SRES scenarios (black; Wigley and Raper 2001).
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Fig 3 live 4/CThe right column in Fig. 2 shows colored bands of
constant relative uncertainty around the CMIP3 mean
for each scenario, along with all the individual PDFs
and ranges from the left column in Fig. 2 discussed
above. On the basis of the evidence presented above in
support of a time- and scenario-independent relative
uncertainty, a range of 40% to 60% around the
CMIP3 mean was adopted in the IPCC AR4 (Meehl et
al. 2007) as a “likely” (66% probability) range for the
projected warming in 2100, for the purpose of giving
policy-relevant advice that is easy to understand. The
40% to 60% range adopted in AR4 (Meehl et al.
2007) is indicated by blue lines and represents one of
several defensible syntheses of the uncertainty across
different models and methods. While the model results
support a scenario-independent relative uncertainty
(Fig. 3), the choice of an overall range encompassing
the results from different methods is partly subjective.
While Fig. 2 can provide a summary and some guid-
ance, it is left to the reader to make his/her own expert
judgment about an overall uncertainty range.
When interpreting the results, it is important to note
that not all results are necessarily equally credible, and
there may be processes that are incorrect or missing in
different climate models. In addition, the assumptions
in each study need to be kept in mind. Knutti et al.
(2003), for example, who show the highest upper bound
at the end of the century, used a uniform prior in cli-
mate sensitivity and rather poor constraints, resulting in
a large fraction of simulations with climate sensitivities
up to 10°C. A subsequent study with the same model
has found stronger constraints on climate sensitivity
(Tomassini et al. 2007), which would push the upper
bound of the projections down. Projected ranges in
Bayesian approaches also depend on the prior distribu-
tions (Frame et al. 2005; Tomassini et al. 2007), which
are not identical in all studies, as discussed above. What
seems undisputable from Fig. 2 is the fact that structural
uncertainty (the differences across studies arising from
different assumptions, constraints, and choices of mod-
els) is large. Any uncertainty estimate based on a single
method or model, which does not explicitly account for
that, is therefore likely to underestimate the uncer-
tainty. Figure 2 also highlights that due to the lack of
formal methods to aggregate results, the derivation of
probabilistic projections based on multiple lines of evi-
dence has more subjective elements to it than the cal-
culation of a PDF from a single method.
c. Differences between IPCC TAR and AR4 ranges
The ranges adopted in AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007; Fig. 2,
blue boxes in right column) based on the assumption of
a constant relative uncertainty and using the combined
information from many methods are substantially wider
than the model ranges given in the TAR for individual
scenarios (Fig. 2, yellow bars) for several reasons. Al-
though the TAR projections did account for climate
feedbacks on the carbon cycle, they did not consider
uncertainties in these feedbacks. The TAR range was
based on a simple model tuned to seven AOGCMs, but
no attempt was made to apply observational con-
straints. In contrast, the AR4 uncertainty estimates are
also based on observational constraints and thus con-
sistent with past observed trends and patterns. While
the observational constraints in some of the newer
methods tend to decrease projection uncertainties, this
is outweighed by considering carbon cycle and struc-
tural uncertainties, such that the overall uncertainty
given here is larger than in the TAR. Structural uncer-
tainties include specific assumptions in each probabilis-
tic method (e.g., whether uncertainty in all forcing com-
ponents or just in the aerosol forcing is considered), in
the construction of the climate model (e.g., choice of
cloud parameterization), and in the observational con-
straints that are used [e.g., whether the model results
are compared to observed spatial patterns, or just glob-
al averages; see Tebaldi and Knutti (2007) for a review
of open issues]. These uncertainties all cause differ-
ences in projections between multiple methods, such
that an overall uncertainty estimate accounting for
these structural uncertainties is generally wider than an
estimate from a single method.
The central values given in AR4 for each scenario are
lower than those in the TAR, but the differences are
small, and they should not be interpreted as a revised
understanding of the relevant processes. They are
caused by the fact that the MAGICC model results
(which are tuned to the idealized CMIP3 1% yr
1 CO2
increase scenarios) are slightly higher than the CMIP3
results for the SRES projections mainly due to different
forcing assumptions. The AOGCM mean was used in
AR4 as the central value, while the MAGICC model
results were used as the central numbers in the TAR.
Differences between MAGICC and the CMIP3
AOGCMs arise primarily from the fact that many
AOGCMs do not prescribe all radiative forcing com-
ponents, whereas MAGICC does. In particular, ac-
counting for the indirect aerosol effect (which is not
included in many AOGCMs) in MAGICC leads to a
larger radiative forcing increase between the base pe-
riod 1980–99 and the end of the century and causes the
projected change for the years 2090–99 to be higher by
a few tenths of a degree. Small differences can arise
from the fact that the MAGICC climate feedback and
ocean heat uptake is tuned to the 1% yr
1 CO2 increase
rather than the scenario simulations. In addition,
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each scenario, even if some models do not provide all
scenarios. This issue of sampling is also present in the
multimodel ensemble, which is a rather arbitrary snap-
shot in time of the models available for the assessment,
and not necessarily representative of our understanding
of all the uncertainties that exist. However, those ef-
fects are small, and the different assumptions in radia-
tive forcing explain a large part of the differences be-
tween MAGICC and the AOGCMs.
Apart from differences between MAGICC and the
AOGCMS, in theory, differences could arise from both
forcings and feedbacks being different in the new
CMIP3 AOGCM ensemble (see Fig. 1) and the
AOGCM ensemble used in the TAR. The mean of the
TCR (the global average surface warming at the time of
CO2 doubling in an idealized scenario where CO2 in-
creases by 1% yr
1)i s1 . 8 °C, with a standard deviation
of 0.4°C. Both the mean and standard deviation of TCR
are virtually identical in the old and new AOGCM en-
semble. The TCR measures the strengths of the rel-
evant feedback processes and transient ocean heat up-
take, does not depend on the carbon cycle, and is al-
most unaffected by forcing uncertainties. Projections
for the end of the twenty-first century for SRES sce-
narios are linearly related to the TCR. Therefore, de-
spite considerable progress in model development and
the availability of many more models for AR4 (Meehl
et al. 2007), the best estimate for the sum of all transient
physical feedbacks remains unchanged.
The projections in the TAR did not consider volcanic
and solar forcing during the twentieth century. The in-
clusion of these forcings and the fact that more models
now consider indirect aerosol forcing leads to smaller
net forcing over the twentieth century and a larger net
forcing increase over the twenty-first century, and pro-
jected warming for the years 2090–99 relative to the
base period should be slightly higher. But additional
simple model simulations, however, show the effect to
be small, about a tenth of a degree. Differences in how
other forcings are accounted for, and their efficacies
(Hansen et al. 2005) in the different models might lead
to other small differences. Unfortunately, for some of
the old and new AOGCMs the information provided by
the modeling groups about what components of the
radiative forcing were used, what their magnitude is,
and how they were implemented, is incomplete and
makes a detailed separation of all effects impossible.
In summary, the TAR AOGCM mean (for the sce-
narios where it is available) is very similar to the AR4
AOGCM mean for both the SRES projections and the
transient climate response, suggesting that the sum of
the physical feedbacks is similar, and the effects of dif-
ferences in forcings are not significant when averaged
across all models. The differences in projections from
the TAR are attributable to different forcing assump-
tions in the MAGICC model versus the CMIP3
AOGCMs, and do not reflect a change in our under-
standing of the sum of the relevant physical feedback
processes that affect the transient warming.
d. The effect of uncertainties in the carbon cycle
feedbacks
The overall range of different methods is larger than
the CMIP3 AOGCM range, because (as noted above)
the AOGCM simulations do not span the full possible
uncertainty range and do not sample carbon cycle un-
certainties. Climate impacts on the carbon cycle are
important and very likely provide a positive feedback
on temperature, with warming leading to a reduced
fraction of CO2 emissions being taken up by the ocean
and terrestrial biosphere, and an increased fraction of
the emissions staying airborne, thus causing more
warming than would be produced if the carbon cycle
were insensitive to climate change (Joos et al. 2001;
Plattner et al. 2001; Friedlingstein et al. 2006). Figure 4
FIG. 4. Uncertainty in global-mean surface temperature in-
crease for the end of the century (2090–99 relative to 1980–99) for
the SRES A2 scenario. Blue, green, and red colors indicate no
carbon cycle feedback (i.e., climate held constant for the carbon
cycle), a nonzero carbon cycle feedback with constant parameters,
and a nonzero carbon cycle feedback with uncertainty (perturbed
parameters in the carbon cycle), respectively. Means and 1
ranges for the MAGICC and means and min–max ranges for the
Bern2.5CC models are as in Fig. 2, with constant (green) and
variable parameters in the carbon cycle (red). Results from the
C4MIP models (Friedlingstein et al. 2006; dots) and their mean
(circle) are shown for the uncoupled (blue) and coupled carbon
cycle (red). The 5%–95% ranges from PDFs derived with the
Bern EMIC (Knutti et al. 2003) without (uncoupled, blue) and
with (coupled, red) carbon cycle feedbacks are shown for the case
where climate sensitivity is only constrained by observations (as in
Fig. 2).
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Fig 4 live 4/Cshows uncertainty ranges from different studies and
models with no carbon cycle feedbacks (i.e., constant
climate prescribed for the carbon cycle), with feedbacks
but fixed parameters in the carbon cycle, and with feed-
backs and their uncertainty considered by perturbing
parameters in the carbon cycle in different simulations.
Results are shown from single models with perturbed
parameters in the carbon cycle (Bern2.5CC and
MAGICC), from a probabilistic study accounting for
carbon cycle feedbacks with a simple feedback term
(Knutti et al. 2003) and for a set of structurally different
C4MIP coupled carbon cycle models (Friedlingstein et
al. 2006). Independent of model and carbon cycle com-
plexity included, these results indicate that uncertain-
ties arising from climate feedbacks on the carbon cycle
are less important than uncertainties associated with
future emissions and climate sensitivity (see Fig. 2), and
have little effect on the lower bound of the projected
range, but affect the upper bound more strongly, con-
sistent with earlier studies (Wigley and Raper 2001;
Knutti et al. 2003).
3. Conclusions
On average the latest generation of CMIP3 AOGCMs
used in AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007) projects changes of
global temperature similar to the AOGCMs used in the
TAR (Cubasch et al. 2001). Best-guess projections in
degrees Celsius and likely ranges (i.e., 66% probabil-
ity, in brackets) given in AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007) for
the six illustrative SRES scenarios are B1: 1.8 (1.1–2.9),
B2: 2.4 (1.4–3.8), A1T: 2.4 (1.4–3.8), A1B: 2.8 (1.7–4.4),
A2: 3.4 (2.0–5.4), and A1FI: 4.0 (2.4–6.4), while the
TAR combined all six scenarios into a single projected
range of 1.4°–5.8°C. For the six scenarios considered
here, the relative contributions of scenario uncertainty
and climate response uncertainty are similar. However,
because of the very different nature of uncertainties in
emissions scenarios versus uncertainties in the model
response, the lack of probabilities assigned to scenarios,
and because only a limited set of nonintervention sce-
narios is considered here, aggregating temperature
ranges across scenarios should be avoided. Differences
of a few tenths of a degree between the best-guess val-
ues given in AR4 versus those in the TAR for the year
2100 are mainly due to different forcing assumptions in
the MAGICC model used in the TAR compared to the
CMIP3 AOGCMs.
The combined information given in Fig. 2 from many
different quantitative methods with a variety of models
and statistical methods, considering uncertainties in ra-
diative forcing, climate feedbacks, ocean heat uptake,
and the carbon cycle, suggest an uncertainty in pro-
jections larger than that covered by the AOGCM
ensemble of opportunity, and larger than the range in-
dicated in the IPCC TAR. The reason for the larger
uncertainty is that uncertainties in the carbon cycle–
climate feedbacks as well as structural uncertainties in
both climate models and probabilistic methods are con-
sidered here when aggregating all results, while those
were not considered in the TAR. We argue that the
concept of a constant relative uncertainty across sce-
narios (irrespective of what percentage is chosen) is
well supported by different studies, and provides a
simple way of giving policy relevant information. The
concept of constant relative uncertainty is also very
likely to hold for other nonmitigation scenarios that
have similar characteristics as the six illustrative SRES
scenarios considered here (i.e., other scenarios approxi-
mately within the SRES range), thus providing an easy
way of estimating uncertainties in global temperature
projections without running many model simulations.
Uncertainties tend to be slightly asymmetric in many
studies, with the lower bound of the expected tempera-
ture increase being comparably well constrained and
the upper bound being more uncertain. The larger un-
certainty on the upper bound is caused by uncertainties
in carbon cycle–climate feedbacks (Plattner et al. 2008),
which are most relevant for high warming, and by the
more uncertain upper bound on climate sensitivity. For
the same reasons, the agreement of different studies is
better for the lower than for the upper bound.
This set of projections reviewed here is based on the
current understanding of climate feedbacks and uncer-
tainties in the carbon cycle–climate interaction. While
uncertainties in the former are relatively well quanti-
fied on the time scales considered here, parts of the
latter are still poorly understood and not generally in-
cluded in carbon cycle models (Friedlingstein et al.
2006; Plattner et al. 2008). In the terrestrial biosphere,
for example, there is a likely temperature feedback on
the methane gas cycle and the possibility that melting
permafrost might cause the release of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere. Also, the effect of CO2 fertiliza-
tion on plants might be smaller than previously thought
(e.g., Ko ¨rner et al. 2005). For the ocean carbon sink,
changes in the atmospheric circulation may have an
effect on the carbon uptake of the Southern Ocean (Le
Quéré et al. 2007), an example of an effect that is un-
likely to be captured in relatively simple carbon cycle
models. Gruber et al. (2004) provide a detailed review
of potential surprises in the biogeochemical cycles.
These are examples of structural uncertainties, where
some processes might be entirely missing in the bio-
geochemistry models. It is important to note that most
of those poorly understood feedbacks are likely to be
1J UNE 2008 KNUTTI ET AL. 2661positive rather than negative, and therefore have the
potential to raise the upper bound of our temperature
uncertainties. The uncertainty in those processes is par-
ticularly large for high emission scenarios and associ-
ated large climate change, where there is no analogous
situation in the past and present where models can be
evaluated.
The results reviewed here also show that the contri-
bution of structural uncertainty to temperature projec-
tions is quite large. There is no statistical method so far
to formally combine the different lines of evidence.
This makes the interpretation of probabilistic projec-
tions not as straightforward as a PDF from a single
method might suggest.
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